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Reforming General Damages: A Good
Tort Reform
Joseph Sanders*
I. INTRODUCTION
In some conflicts, capturing a phrase is half the battle.
Proponents of affirmative action won a significant victory when
they changed the discussion from one of quotas to one of diversity.
Similarly, those who sought to achieve some retrenchment in tort
law gained a substantial advantage when they commandeered the
term "tort reform" to describe their undertaking and then
persuaded most American state legislatures to enact provisions
favorable to their position. Needless to say, those who oppose
their agenda do not agree that most of what has occurred is
reform in a positive sense. Hence, the title of this symposium-
Genuine Tort Reform. What, however, counts as "genuine"?
"Genuine" itself conveys the implicit message that what has
previously gone under the banner of tort reform is not genuine. If
so, what is it? Fake? Counterfeit? No, I prefer a simpler idea. I
would like to talk about good tort reform, or at least better tort
reform, the opposite of which is simply bad or worse tort reform.
In this paper, I sketch out what I believe good reform would
look like and then discuss one frequently suggested reform that I
believe meets this definition-limitations on general damages
variability. 1 In Part II, I review tort reform over the last two
A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. There are three basic categories of damages: nominal, compensatory,
and punitive. Within the compensatory category, damages are generally
divided into two groups, special and general. "Special damages" is a term
meant to convey all damages on which we can, at least in theory, put a price.
Special damages, or "specials," are also called "economic damages." They
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decades and how this compares to other "reforms" of the tort
system over the last century or so. In Part III, I offer my criteria
for determining if a reform is better or worse. Part IV presents
the research evidence on general damages variability. Part V
reviews the possible solutions to this problem: doing nothing,
imposing caps, abolishing general damages altogether, and the
use of greater jury guidance and/or greater post verdict review to
reduce variability in general damage awards. I conclude with a
discussion of why the latter alternative counts as good tort reform.
II. TORT REFORM IN CONTEXT
A. Changes in Tort Law over the Last Century or So
Although "tort reform" as a social movement is a recent
phenomenon, it is hardly the first, and certainly will not be the
last round of changes in tort law. Historically, because torts has
been the last bastion of the common law, most changes have
occurred as a result of judicial opinion rather than legislative
enactment. The movement toward strict liability in products law
in the mid-twentieth century and then the slow retreat back to a
negligence-like standard for most types of products defects
occurred largely through the mechanism of judicial opinions. 2 The
changes in products liability law over this period is but one facet
of a more general "plaintiff-oriented expansion" of tort law in the
1950s and 1960s and at least a partial retrenchment later in the
include such things as hospital bills, lost wages, rehabilitation expenses, etc.
"General damages" is a term meant to convey other types of damages that do
not constitute real expenses the plaintiff has incurred or is anticipated to
incur in the future. They are often called "noneconomic damages." Typically,
these damages include pain and suffering, some aspects of loss of consortium,
loss of enjoyment of life, etc. In this paper, I will use the terms "noneconomic
damages," "general damages," and "pain and suffering damages"
interchangeably, although in other contexts one might wish to acknowledge
that pain and suffering damages are only a subset of noneconomic and
general damages.
2. David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV.
LITIG. 955 (2007). Owen also discusses even earlier "reforms" whereby
products cases were taken out of the tort system through the rubric of the
privity rule and then brought back in by the rule's evisceration at the hands
of Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916).
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century.3
The primacy of court-led change does not mean that the
legislative-led changes of the "tort reform" movement are anything
new. An early example of legislative change is the adoption of the
wrongful death statutes.4 Two more recent examples of legislative
change are the largely successful effort to remove workplace
injuries from the tort regime5 and the largely unsuccessful effort
to create a no-fault system to handle automobile accident cases. 6
Likewise, the movement in the 1970s from contributory negligence
to comparative fault was most frequently undertaken by way of
statute,7 although it also occurred by way of judicial opinion.8
Numerous jurisdictions have also passed legislation in the area of
medical malpractice 9 and products liability. 10 It is within this
context that we should assess the tort reform movement.
B. Tort Reform Movement of the Last Thirty Years.
Although it is impossible to establish a firm date for the
beginning of what is now commonly called "tort reform," most
scholars would agree that the first sustained "round" of tort
reform legislation occurred in the 1970s in response to the first
3. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW
46 (2001); F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform"
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2006); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning
and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L.
REV. 601, 605 (1992); Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1465 (2007) [hereinafter Sebok, Dispatches]. For an interesting
article relating this history to the role of blame in tort law, see Anthony J.
Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
1031 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, The Fall and Rise].
4. Wrongful death statutes altered the judge-made common law rule
that one's cause of action died with oneself.
5. See Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products Torts'
Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 943 (2006).
6. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW
(2004); Sebok, The Fall and Rise, supra note 3, at 1046.
7. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 2007).
8. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (en banc).
9. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 74. (2000).
10. See, e.g., id. ch. 82. These numerous legislative encroachments have
steadily eroded tort law's status as the last great bastion of the common law.
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medical malpractice insurance crisis. 11  This legislation was
followed by a second insurance hard market in the 1980s which
precipitated a second round of legislation. 12 By the end of the
second round, the basic content of these reforms was in place. The
components are so well known that a mere listing will suffice:
completion of the movement to comparative fault; prohibiting ad
damnum clauses; requiring some form of alternative dispute
resolution process; limits on contingent fees; periodic payment
provisions; new restrictions on governmental liability and the re-
emergence of limits on charitable organization liability; changing
the collateral source rule; limitations on joint and several liability;
new rules concerning punitive damages; 13  and caps on
compensatory damages (usually limited to general damages). 14
The 1980s were not the end of the process. 15 Initially, many
states took tentative steps directed solely at medical malpractice.
Over time, the states have fleshed out their statutes by adding
additional components to their list 16 and have caused many of the
11. See PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1985); Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of
the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1986); G. Edward
White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Perspective, 32
VILL. L. REV. 1265 (1987).
12. Allen Redlich, Ending the Never-Ending Medical Malpractice Crisis,
38 ME. L. REV. 283 (1986). The relationship between the tort system and
hard insurance markets has been hotly contested over the years. See
DANZON, supra note 11; Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort
Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004);
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races'" The
1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990);
Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1990).
13. These include caps, higher burdens of proof (clear and convincing),
and higher standards of culpable behavior (malice).
14. To this list we might add the judicially inspired movement toward
heightened admissibility standards for expert witnesses that commonly goes
by the name "the Daubert revolution." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509
U.S. 579 (1993).
15. A third hard insurance market near the turn of the century led to
another burst of legislative activity. See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice
and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Not-So-Peaceful Coexistence: Inherent Tensions in Addressing
Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 337 (2004).
16. For example, many states now have "John Doe" provisions that
permit defendants to join unknown individuals as third parties. Jurors may
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provisions to apply to all tort cases.
The great majority of these efforts has been enacted at the
behest of defense interests and is designed to create a more
favorable tort system from its point of view. 17 These efforts have
been opposed by plaintiff interests who, when they have lost in the
legislature, have turned to the courts in a frequently successful
effort to have some or all of the statutes declared unconstitutional
under the relevant state constitution.1 8
The tort reform movement of the last thirty years is
inextricably wrapped up in interest-group politics and much of the
rhetoric that surrounds the process must be understood in that
context.19 The claimed benefits and harms of reform are often
exaggerated and it is impossible to argue persuasively that all of
the legislation is well thought through or that all the criticisms
are cogent. For example, if the object of most tort reform
legislation is to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance,
considerable research indicates that tort suits are far from being
the most important cause of hard insurance markets. 20
Some may be tempted to say that the whole tort reform
enterprise is a mistake and that we would be better off without
this legislation. A more reasoned approach would assess each
change in turn. From this perspective, the changes may be more
or less reasonable. At one extreme is the movement to
comparative responsibility. Few would argue that this was
unwise. Although most statutes abolishing the contributory
negligence rule preceded tort reform, they are a precipitating
assign a percentage of responsibility to these unknown individuals, although
clearly there is little or no chance the plaintiff can ever collect a judgment
against them. Indeed, the party may have immunity. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.81 (West 2008).
17. There are other pockets of legislation during this period that are not
generally included under the rubric of tort reform, most notably legislation
facilitating state lawsuits against tobacco companies in the 1990s. See
FAIGMAN ET AL., 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 27 (2006-2007 ed.).
18. See, e.g., Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis.
2005) (striking down a statute placing a cap on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice actions). But see Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah
2004); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007).
19. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs' Practice in the
Age of Tort Reform: Survival of the Fittest - It's Even More True Now, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 288 (2006-2007); Sebok, Dispatches, supra note 3.
20. Baker, supra note 15.
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cause of many later changes.
Changes in the joint and several liability rules, changes which
are usually associated with the tort reform movement, are a case
in point. 21 The moral force of joint and several liability is very
strong in a contributory negligence legal system where, by
definition, every prevailing plaintiff is not legally responsible.
Once we move to comparative fault the plaintiff may be legally
responsible, and some defendants may be adjudged to be far less
responsible for an injury than the plaintiff. In this context, the
moral force of the joint and several liability rule is largely
absent. 22  This does not mean that every alternative rule is
equally good. Some alternatives, such as the complete abolition of
joint and several liability in all situations, may be worse than
other alternatives such as a reallocation of liability based on
percentage of fault when one defendant is in fact judgment
proof.2
3
Other reforms such as limitations on contingent fees and
changes in the collateral source rule seem to be motivated at least
in part by a less legitimate desire to discourage lawsuits by
making them less attractive to plaintiffs and their attorneys.24
21. Under joint and several liability a prevailing plaintiff may recover
the entire judgment from any liable defendant, whose remedy in turn is to
seek contribution from other responsible defendants. When a defendant is
not jointly and severally liable - or as is sometimes said, is only severally
liable - the plaintiff may only recover the percentage of the judgment
assigned to that defendant and must collect separately from each defendant
to obtain the entire judgment. When the joint and several liability rule is in
place, the risk that some defendants may be judgment proof falls on co-
defendants. In the absence of the rule, the risk falls on the plaintiff.
22. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
Plaintiff adjudged to be 14% responsible for her injury was allowed to recover
the rest of her damages against a defendant assigned 1% of the responsibility
for the accident. This result was subsequently superseded by statute. See
Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
23. For a summary of the many variations states have adopted, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 1-26 (2000).
24. This is not to say there are no principled arguments for these
changes. For example, individuals who support a change in the collateral
source rule, under which funds from a collateral source (usually an insurance
policy) are not deducted from a plaintiffs award, may do so because they
believe the primary goal of tort law is compensation and there is no reason to
provide redundant recoveries for the same injury. On the other hand, those
who think that deterrence is a primary goal may believe that the traditional
rule maximized the internalization of costs to those who cause them. I find
REFORMING GENERAL DAMAGES
Insofar as this is the case, the changes are hard to justify.
Then there are the reforms that address general damages. As
I argue below, there is a real problem with general damages
variability. Some argue that caps on general damages are a
solution to this variability. However, as I argue in Part V, this
solution is open to several criticisms. Caps do not directly address
the problem of variability and, insofar as the size of pain and
suffering awards are a function of the size of the special damage
awards, the practical consequence of caps is systematically to
disadvantage the most seriously injured plaintiffs. 25
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: GOOD TORT REFORM
Many who oppose what has been done in the name of tort
reform may believe that good tort reform would return to the
status quo before the laws were passed. There are some
provisions for which this seems to be a proper course. I do not
intend to address this option. Instead, I would rather look
forward to new changes. What new tort reform efforts are worth
undertaking? What does good reform look like? From my point of
view, a good reform has several attributes.
First, it must be doable. This practical consideration
forecloses a number of possible changes. For example, in the
aftermath of the United States Supreme Court rulings in Gore,
State Farm, and Williams26 it seems futile to propose a return to
the law of punitive damages that existed prior to its
constitutionalization. Similarly, with the rewriting of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to reflect the Supreme Court's holding in
Daubert and its progeny,2 7 changing admissibility rules at the
federal level (and at many state levels for that matter) is
unlikely. 2 8 As these examples suggest, a wholesale repeal of "tort
myself on the side of the latter group, but I can see the point of the opposing
point of view.
25. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and
Suffering Awards, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 430 (2006).
26. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Philip Morris USA
v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
27. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
28. To this list of improbable changes one might add returning to
products liability law as it was envisioned under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A and returning to complete joint and several liability for all
2008]
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reform" legislation is not in the offing.
Second, a good reform addresses an aspect of the current tort
regime that most would agree produces unjust outcomes. The
legal system as a whole would be better off were this change to be
made.
Third, good reforms are those that enjoy some support from
all relevant constituencies, perhaps because most agree they
address an occurrence of injustice. 29  Good reforms may be
fundamental or modest.30 An example of a fundamental change is
the movement to workers compensation at the beginning of the
last century. Most would agree that it addressed a problem of
frequent injustice in work related injury cases. The change
occurred primarily because industry and labor reached an
agreement about the nature of the reform. 31 Similar fundamental
changes in medical malpractice or automobile accident law may or
may not be good policy, but achieving them will require the
emergence of a similar consensus, a consensus that in the present
climate seems quite unlikely. 32
negligent defendants.
29. A reform is not bad solely because it favors plaintiff or defense
interests, but this does not make it good either. My point is only that those
reforms that can find some support from all relevant interests are better.
30. Some may argue that the very fact that a reform does not
fundamentally alter the existing tort system itself counts as a plus. If this is
a criterion, and it is not clear to me that it should be, this counts in favor of
the defense-oriented tort reform of the last few decades. By and large, it has
not attempted to make fundamental doctrinal changes nor has it seriously
pursued efforts to remove whole types of injuries from the tort system.
31. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the
Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
32. For glimpses of what a no-fault medical malpractice regime might
look like, see PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991);
Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1626
(2002); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model
of "No-Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM.
J.L. & MED. 225, 228 (2001); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical
Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908 (1993). A small step in this direction has
occurred in the area of vaccinations. See National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-1 to -33 (2000). Under the statute, one may
opt out and sue in tort. (However, this election is final and if one loses the
tort claim one cannot then request compensation under the act). See Shackil
v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d. 511 (N.J. 1989). For a review of other no fault
plans over the recent decades, see Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of
Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699, 703-13 (2005).
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We might, however, agree upon more modest endeavors, ones
that do not fundamentally alter the existing regime. My
candidate for such a reform is in the area of general damages.
IV. GENERAL DAMAGES VARIABILITY
General damages are a central component of the American
tort system. 33 They are notoriously uncertain. 34 This uncertainty
produces inconsistency. Evidence that jurors reach inconsistent
results on general damages comes from a substantial body of
research.3 5
Several themes dominate this research. First, the severity of
the injury suffered by the plaintiff is a reasonably good predictor
of the level of all damages, including general damages. For
example, Bovbjerg and colleagues analyzed jury awards in Florida
and Kansas City from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s and found
that injury severity (as measured on a nine-point ordinal scale)
33. Best estimates are that general damages make up approximately
50% of total damage awards across at least some types of tort cases. Patricia
M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
Evidence, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1986); Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for
Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 296 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in
Products Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988).
34. I am far from the first person to make this point. See, e.g., Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 924-27 (1989); Oscar G. Chase, Helping
Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,
768-69 (1995); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments about
Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase
Consistency, 48 DEPAuL L. REV. 301, 313-17 (1998); Frederick S. Levin, Pain
and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement 'Anomie," 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 307-11 (1989); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh,
Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 997, 997-99 (1990); Sugarman, supra note 25; Viscusi,
supra note 33.
35. The following discussion borrows from Joseph Sanders, Why Do
Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General Damages (Generally)
Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489
(2006).
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was the best predictor of overall damage awards. 36 This variable,
when combined with other objective variables available to the
authors, explained approximately 60% of the variation in total
awards and a somewhat smaller percentage of noneconomic
awards.37
However, within each category of injury, pain and suffering
damages exhibited considerable variance. For example, for the
category "permanent significant," category six on the nine point
scale, a category that includes injuries such as deafness, loss of a
limb, one eye, kidney, or lung, the mean pain and suffering award
was $386,000 (in 1987 dollars). The award at the 25th percentile
36. The scale is the product of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. Here are the nine categories:
Severity of Injury Examples
1. Emotional only
2. Temporary insignificant
3. Temporary minor
4. Temporary major
5. Permanent minor
6. Permanent significant
7. Permanent major
8. Permanent Grave
Fright, no physical damage.
Lacerations, contusions,
minor scars, rash. No delay.
Infections, misset fracture,
fall in hospital. Recovery
delayed.
Burns, surgical material
left, drug side-effect, brain
damage. Recovery delayed.
Loss of fingers, loss or
damage to organs. Include
non-disabling injuries.
Deafness, loss of limb, loss
of eye, loss of one kidney or
lung.
Paraplegia, blindness, loss
of two limbs, brain damage.
Quadriplegia, severe brain
damage, lifelong care or
fatal prognosis.
9. Death
Obviously, these are very crude categories. THE NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 48-66 (M. Sowka ed., 1980).
37. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 923, 941 n.156 (1989). Other
variables included plaintiff age, type of defendant (government, non-
government), type of case (e.g., products liability), whether the case involved
a loss of consortium claim, and jurisdiction.
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was $9,000 while the award at the 75th percentile was $598,000.38
Other studies have produced similar results. 39  For example,
Sugarman reports that in twelve quadriplegia cases decided a few
years on either side of the year 2000, pain and suffering awards
ranged from one dollar to six million dollars.
40
In one study, Leebron examined jury and trial judge awards
for pain and suffering in cases where the plaintiff died prior to
trial. 41  He reviewed 256 reported appellate opinions where
general damages were awarded, admittedly a very selective
sample. For each case, he had information on how long an
individual lived after the injury. Except for very short survival
times (less than half a minute) and relatively longer times (over a
week) duration is not significantly related to the size of the
award.4 2  Within duration intervals there is a substantial
variation in awards. For example, in a particularly useful
analysis, he compares awards for drowning victims who, as a
group, suffer a similar fate for a similar duration of time. Awards
in these cases varied from zero to over $137,000, with the average
being $32,000 and a standard deviation of $36,000 (in 1987
dollars). After appellate review, the awards ranged from $4,300 to
$52,800. 4 3
Substantial variance is also observed in experimental studies.
Wissler et al. gave mock jurors scenarios and asked them to assign
general damages.4 4 They found substantial vertical equity in the
38. Id. at 937.
39. See MARK A. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY (1984); Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 34; Viscusi,
supra note 33; Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering"
Awards: The Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 181 (1997).
40. Sugarman, supra note 25, at 414.
41. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering
Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989).
42. Id. at 294.
43. Id. at 297. For other research that has found considerable
"horizontal" variance, see AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS,
EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 56-57 (1985); Sloan
& Hsieh, supra note 34, at 1026 ("In several respects, payment patterns
appear to be inequitable horizontally, but each finding has a possible
contrary explanation."); Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of
Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims,
117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781 (1992).
44. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A
2008] 125
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sense that people who were perceived to have suffered more
serious injuries received larger awards on average than people
who were perceived to have suffered lesser injuries.45 However,
they too observed substantial variance in awards within each
scenario. 46
Research that compares juries to other potential fact finders
such as arbitrators, finds that their median and mean awards are
comparable. 47 However, jurors exhibit more variance. The study
by Wissler et al. compares juror awards with those of judges and
lawyers. Respondents were given short vignettes and asked to
assess the severity of the victim's injuries. They were then asked
to assess damages. All groups were similar in their severity
assessment. However, jurors were less able than the other groups
to translate this assessment into a dollar amount of actual
damage awards. In the authors' final regression models, they
were able to explain 58% of the variance in defense attorney
awards, 48% for plaintiff attorneys, 42% for judges, but only 28%
for jurors.4 8  The authors note that these "patterns of
predictability and intra-injury variability in awards are not
surprising, given that jurors have essentially no experience
assigning a dollar value to injuries while the other groups do. ' '4 9
Most explanations of the variability we observe in general
damage awards place particular emphasis on how anchoring
effects influence decision making. 50 Whenever people are asked to
Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999).45. Id. at 795. But see Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and
Defendant Reprehensibility: Implications for Compensatory and Punitive
Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996).
46. Wissler et al., supra note 44, at 794. See also Diamond et al., supra
note 34, at 306-11.
47. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage
Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal
Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 893 (1993).
48. Wissler et al., supra note 44, at 794.
49. Id.
50. Anchoring is not the only variable affecting general damage awards.
For example, Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive
Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) have a
useful discussion on how the way in which the general damages issue is put
to the jury (framing effects) alters judgments. Asking the jury to "make theplaintiff whole" is one such frame, which is different from a "selling price"
frame that asks the jury to imagine how much the plaintiff would have to be
paid to subject himself to the injury in the first place. Id. at 1342. Plaintiff
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make numerical estimates, initial values tend to "anchor" their
final estimate by changing the standard of reference that they use
when making their numerical judgment. 51 Anchoring effects
occur even when individuals conclude that the anchor contains no
useful information. 52
It may be that unwarranted variance is less than these
studies suggest, either because the variance witnessed is really an
artifact of the crude measures of damages used in the research, or
because there are other, legitimate considerations that are
causing jurors to award substantially different sums for what
appear to be similar injuries. Both points have some merit. The
measures of the severity of injury are crude and it may be that
other, subjective variables shape individual judgments. It seems
quite unlikely, however, that all the differences we observe can be
explained in this way. When researchers permit respondents to
make finer judgments of severity, as occurred in the Wissler et al.
study we still see substantial differences in awards. 53 Moreover,
the differences revealed in the studies are often large and it is
difficult to imagine a set of subjective factors that would explain
such large differences in pain and suffering awards.
The conclusion that the uncertainty in general damage
awards produces a potential problem of individual unfairness
and defendant culpability also affect the size of noneconomic awards. See
Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990);
Cather et al., supra note 45.
51. The following discussion of anchoring is borrowed from Chris Guthrie
et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787-89 (2001).
52. Beginning with the Chicago Jury Project in the 1950s, legal scholars
have observed anchoring effects in jury judgments on damages and have been
able to produce these effects in the laboratory. See Dale W. Broeder, The
University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 756 (1959) (reporting
that interviews conducted with jurors revealed that plaintiffs' damage
requests anchored juror damage determinations in six of seven cases);
Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More
You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 519, 525-28, 532-33 (1996); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl,
Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991, 1009-10, 1016 (1995); John Malouff & Nicola S.
Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage
Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 495 (1989);
Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony
on Jurors'Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 390-94 (1990).
53. Wissler et al., supra note 44.
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seems to me to be inescapable. Equally situated individuals may
experience substantially different outcomes. If fairness and
justice require that we treat like cases alike and different cases
differently, such variability in general damages undermines these
values. One federal circuit judge expressed the problem this way:
At bottom, we are left with the following abstract
observation. When a tortfeasor wrongfully causes a
plaintiff to suffer pain from a seriously broken leg and a
jury awards the plaintiff $50,000 for pain and suffering,
can it be said that the award was against the facts, that it
was inappropriate, or that it was in any way illegal or
wrong? And when another jury returns an award for the
same pain and suffering in an amount of $350,000, could
any rational analysis lead to the conclusion that the
second jury acted against the facts, acted inappropriately,
or reached an illegal or wrong verdict? Yet one verdict is
seven times the other, and the irrationality of the awards
is made manifest. 54
V. SOLUTIONS
If variance is a problem with general damages, how might we
respond? Four possibilities come to mind. First, for those who
think there is no problem or that any cure would be worse than
the disease, the proper course of action is to do nothing. Second, is
the most widely adopted solution to date: imposing some form of
caps on general damages. Third, there is the radical solution of
abolishing general damages completely. The fourth is to adopt
some method to limit variability in general damages. I discuss
each of these in turn.
A. Do nothing
One might argue that even if the differences we observe are
real, this is not a problem, or at least it is a necessary evil.
Variance is an unavoidable fact of life in a system that prides
itself on individualized justice. Insofar as one adopts this position,
there is no problem to be addressed. Perhaps this argument
54. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering. The Irrational
Centerpiece of Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1417 (2004).
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resonates with parts of the bar. Based on the limited data we do
have from mass tort situations, I believe that this is a point of
view held by a very small minority of the population at large.
55
B. Caps
1. Defense Interest in Caps
Because there is no market for pain and suffering, even after
an accident has occurred it is difficult to estimate general
damages in an individual case. 56 This uncertainty may alter
settlement strategies for the risk averse who wish to avoid
outcomes at the tail of the damages distribution, e.g., very low or
very high awards. 57
55. For a discussion of compensation under the 9/11 fund, see Stephan
Landsman, A Chance To Be Heard: Thoughts About Schedules, Caps, and
Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2003). Landsman notes that concern for
horizontal equity was strongest with respect to noneconomic losses:
Despite a strikingly liberal standard for the calculation of
noneconomic losses, the Special Master decreed a flat and fixed
presumed award for all those who died: 'The presumed noneconomic
losses for decedents shall be $250,000 plus an additional $50,000 for
the spouse and each dependent of the deceased victim. Such
presumed losses include a noneconomic component of replacement
services loss.' Claimants could seek to prove 'extraordinary
circumstances' that might justify departure from this fixed sum, but
they were given no guidance or encouragement.
Id. at 402. (quoting September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,246 (Mar. 13, 2002)).
56. There is uncertainty with respect to special damages as well. For
example, it is difficult to calculate accurately the cost of long term health care
for seriously injured individuals, especially when there are different levels of
care accompanied by different price tags. See McDonald v. United States,
555 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Estimating earnings capacity can also be a
difficult task. By and large, however, there are markets for these damages
and these markets provide some anchoring. See Anthony J. Sebok,
Translating the Immeasurable Thinking About Pain and Suffering
Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 379, 390 (2006).
57. It is not clear how damages uncertainty affects settlement rates.
Theoretically, greater uncertainty may increase the likelihood of settlement
because it increases the range of outcomes preferable to litigation. On the
other hand, this uncertainty may cause the parties to so wildly disagree
about the value of a case that they do not perceive there to be a set of
outcomes superior to litigation for both parties. This latter risk is diminished
insofar as attorneys use services such as that provided by Jury Verdict
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Given this situation, plaintiffs as a group must be concerned
about the low end of general damage distributions. Even when
plaintiffs are awarded an amount that fully covers their economic
damages, a pain and suffering award of zero will leave them with
far less than full compensation after they pay their attorney.
Stated this way, however, the problem rarely finds its way into
the law reviews or the public discourse about what is wrong with
tort law. The plaintiff personal injury bar does not complain
about low general damage awards per se. 58
Defendants, however, are not bashful when it comes to
complaining about the high end of the general damages
distribution. From one perspective, this concern is surprising.
Other things being equal, one would expect that risk aversion is a
Research that provide case evaluations to attorneys. The attorney inputs
information about a case and JVR software provides a estimate of the value
of a claim. See Sebok, supra note 56. Note that these values are derived from
past jury awards. This is the very information that many of the proposals I
discuss below wish to give to the jury.
Even if damages uncertainty were shown to increase settlements,
this may not be an altogether good thing. Professor Kritzer reports the
results of an experiment in which twenty pairs of lawyers who practiced in
the Des Moines, Iowa area were given the same information about a single
case and asked to retire and negotiate a settlement in private before
reassembling to discuss their settlement. The low settlement figure was
$15,000 and the high figure was $95,000 with other settlements scattered
randomly between the high and low values. Herbert Kritzer, Contingent-Fee
Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and
Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
795, 817 (1998). For some other theoretical discussions of the settlement
process, see Joseph A. Grundfest, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Robert J. Rhee, A Price
Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and
Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 683 (2006).
58. As we shall see, however, the plaintiffs bar does complain that caps
may produce lower general damage and this in turn may cause lawyers to
refuse to take a case at all. Caps are far from the only factor that may affect
a willingness to take a case. Of equal if not greater importance are the limits
of an insurance policy. It is relatively rare for plaintiffs to recover sums
greater than insurance policy limits if those sums must come from the
personal assets of the plaintiff. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money,
and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 275
(2001); Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice
Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, J. LEGAL STUD. S9
(2007) (reporting data from closed claims in Texas that indicate physicians
carry much less insurance than is conventionally believed, that policy limits
often act as effective caps on recovery, and that personal contributions by
physicians to close claims are rare).
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more serious problem for plaintiffs than for defendants. Many
defendants are insurance companies who handle numerous
similar cases. It is easier to estimate general damages in a group
of cases than in any individual case. Thus, repeat players such as
insurance companies have an advantage over one-shot players
because across their portfolio of cases they are able to estimate
average payouts, and a higher than expected payout in one case
will be offset by a lower than expected payout in another case.
59
Why, then, do defendants care? Part of the answer is that not
all defendants are repeat players in this sense. They do not hold a
portfolio of independent accidents about which they can say that
over the long run general damage awards will balance out. Many
are one-shot or nearly one-shot players. Even when a given
defendant faces numerous claims from the same incident, e.g., the
same defective drug, these cases are not independent of each other
in the same way that the individual automobile accident cases in
State Farm's portfolio are independent. The resolution of one case
or a few cases may set the standard for the resolution of future
cases.
60
Moreover, defense interests may be concerned about a
separate aspect of general damages: their overall growth. There is
some evidence to suggest that they do have something to worry
about. Hard numbers are difficult to come by, but it is probably
the case that over the last half-century general damages have
increased faster than inflation and economic growth. As Sebok
says, "certain noneconomic damages have been around for a long
time, and when we compare their change over time, we see-to
put it bluntly-that pain is worth more now than it was forty
years ago."6 1 Perhaps because of these dual concerns-variability
59. The classic paper on this point is Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 95 (1974-1975).
60. For a discussion of this process in the context of the Dalkon Shield
litigation, see RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
61. Sebok, supra note 56, at 385. General damage awards in the United
States are much more generous than in Europe. For example, Sugarman
presents evidence that the median pain and suffering award for the loss of a
leg in the United States is approximately eighteen times greater than in
Europe. Even larger ratios exist for blindness (fifty-two times larger) and
quadriplegia (twenty-seven times larger). Sugarman, supra note 25, at 418
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and growth in the average award size-defense interests have
strongly supported caps as a way to control general damages.
Certainly, a central part of their argument for caps has been that
they would control the cost of insurance, especially medical
malpractice insurance by holding down damage awards. Defense
interests have been fairly successful in getting caps: caps are the
most widespread response to uncertainty in general damage
awards.
Damage caps were first introduced as a part of the initial
rounds of tort reform following the hard medical malpractice
insurance markets in the 1970s and 1980s.62 By the late 1980s
approximately half of the states had placed caps on noneconomic
damages, a percentage that may have grown slightly in recent
years. 63 Relatively few commentators have supported caps. 64 The
law review literature is now replete with articles criticizing caps
and proposing alternatives.
tbl.14. These ratios are somewhat inflated by the fact that when Sugarman
did his analysis the exchange rate was much more favorable toward the
dollar. See also Sebok, supra note 56, at 392.
62. The call for caps is nothing new. See William Zelermyer, Damages
for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 32 (1954-1955). For a very
useful discussion of early academic concern with pain and suffering awards,
see Philip L Merkel, Pain and Suffering Damages at Mid-Twentieth Century:
A Retrospective View of the Problem and the Legal Academy's First Responses,
34 CAP. U. L. REV. 545 (2006).
63. An exact count of states with caps is hard to come by, in part, because
state supreme courts have struck down caps in a number of states. For
various counts, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of
Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 412, app. 1 (2005)
(Twenty-nine states, with an appendix that lists the relevant statutes);
Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL
L. REV. 293, 306 n.60 (2007) (Twenty-five states). Ronen Avraham has a
dataset of tort law reforms from 1980 to 2005 on his law school home page.
See Northwestern University, Ronen Avraham, http://www.law.northwestern
.edu/faculty/profiles/RonenAvraham (last visited July 2, 2008). It is
particularly useful if one wants to know the specific years reforms were
enacted, repealed, or overturned by courts. Hoffman reports that since 2000
legislatures in eight states (Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia) have passed legislation imposing some
form of caps. Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to
Justice: The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
217, 264 (2006-2007). The caps ranged from a low of $150,000 to a high of
$1,000,000.
64. An exception is WEILER, supra note 32, at 58-59.
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2. The Effect of Caps on Litigation Rates and Size of Awards
Many of these articles argue that if the primary criterion
upon which to assess caps is whether they control insurance rates
in malpractice cases, there is limited evidence that they achieve
this result. Other factors have a much larger impact on the cost of
medical malpractice insurance. 65  Frequently, these articles
propose alternative reforms that may have a greater effect on
insurance premiums. They include: regulation of insurance
rates;66 creation of a national data base of medical errors designed
to weed out "bad" doctors; 67 requiring plaintiffs to present a
"certificate of merit" from a qualified physician before filing a
suit;68 using court appointed experts to establish the standard of
care;69  creating specialized medical courts;70  and the
implementation of a system of "voluntary caps." 71
Of course, the "if' in the preceding paragraph is questionable.
Although increases in malpractice insurance premiums have very
often been the catalyst for rounds of tort reform, it seems to me
that this is not the most important criterion by which tort reform
should be judged.72 A more central set of questions is what effect
increases in malpractice insurance rates have on litigation rates
and recoveries, and, beyond that, what effect they have on the
practice of medicine and on overall injury rates. 73
65. For a useful discussion, see Baker, supra note 15.
66. Nancy L. Zisk, The Limitations of Legislatively Imposed Damages
Caps: Proposing a Better Way to Control the Costs of Medical Malpractice, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 119 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Kyle Miller, Note, Putting the Caps on Caps: Reconciling the Goal of
Medical Malpractice Reform with the Twin Objectives of Tort Law, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 1457 (2006).
69. Id.
70. Amanda R. Lang, A New Approach to Tort Reform: An Argument for
the Establishment of Specialized Medical Courts, 39 GA. L. REV. 293 (2004-
2005).
71. Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of
Voluntary Caps on Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 CATH. U.
L. REV. 703 (2005).
72. " I do not mean to argue for or against the proposition that controlling
insurance rates was the "true" motivation of tort reformers. My point is only
that regardless of motivations, caps are best judged by other criteria.
73. Very little work has been undertaken to assess whether reforms
impact injury rates. But see Paul H. Rubin, Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007) (reporting research indicating that
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A substantial amount of research has been undertaken to
measure the effect of pain and suffering caps on settlement
practices, overall litigation rates, frequency of statutory
reductions, and average award size. Most of the research is
directed at malpractice cases, but some addresses a wider swath of
tort law.
Experimental evidence (i.e., subjects presented with a set of
materials and asked to bargain to a settlement) indicates that the
existence of caps does have a marginally significant effect on the
likelihood of avoiding trial. This effect is achieved primarily
because a cap reduces uncertainty about the trial outcome,
increasing the chance that there is a contract zone, which in turn
increases the likelihood that opposing subjects will find
agreements that both sides prefer to a trial. 74
noneconomic damage caps, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages,
product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform are associated with
fewer accidental deaths, while reforms to the collateral source rule are
associated with increased deaths between 1981 and 2000). The best
discussion of the relationship between tort reform and defensive medicine is
to be found in TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH ch. 6 (2005). He
makes the important point that one of the worst ways to measure the extent
of defensive medicine is to do so by way of opinion surveys of doctors who
have an incentive to exaggerate the extent to which they engage in this
practice. Better research looks either at hospital records or clinical scenarios.
The results of studies based on those methods lead to the conclusion that
differences in malpractice risk may have a modest effect on the practice of
defensive medicine but other factors such as the growth of managed care tend
to neutralize this effect. Id. at 126, 134.
74. The experimenters also note that subjects come to the bargain with
self-serving biases, causing plaintiffs to predict higher trial outcomes than
defendants. "These biases impede the ability of subjects to reach voluntary
settlements. Beyond the invariable uncertainty reduction that accompanies a
cap, our regression results identify another mechanism through which caps
affect the settlement rate--caps diminish the self-serving biases present in
negotiating pairs." Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and
Settlement: A Behavioral Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 341, 367-68 (1999).
For discussion on the effect of punitive damage caps, see also Jennifer K.
Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The
Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 353 (1999);
Edith Greene et al., The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards, 25 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 217, 229 (2001). The finding concerning the likelihood of
going to trial is consistent with a study by Browne and Puelz that found caps
on noneconomic damages reduce the likelihood of filing suit and the size of
noneconomic damage recoveries in automobile accident cases. Mark J.
Browne & Robert Puelz, The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic
and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File, 18 J. RISK &
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Much of the research on actual case outcomes is summarized
by Avraham. 75 Of all the various components of tort reform, caps
on damages have the greatest effect. Caps are found to reduce the
number of lawsuits filed, the magnitude of awards, and insurance
costs. 76 Avraham's own work covers the period from 1991 to
1998.7 7 He presents state level and individual level data. At the
state level (i.e., comparing awards in states with caps to those in
states without caps), caps reduce the number of cases by 10 to 13%
and reduce total payments by 15 to 20%.78 At the individual case
level, the effects are much larger. His data show that caps on
noneconomic damages reduce average awards by 65 to 70%. 79
Avraham believes that these results are biased and that the real
effect is smaller.80 If so, his findings may be closer to those from
earlier research that also looked at individual level data.
Hyman et al. 81 report similar results for medical malpractice
cases in Texas. 82 Using a simulation method on the Texas Closed
Claims Database data from 1988 to 2004 they estimate that the
2003 cap on non-economic damages affected 47% of the jury
verdicts. It reduced the mean award by 73% and the median
award by 33%. The cap reduced what they term the mean
"allowed verdict-that is the allowable portion of the jury verdict
plus interest-by 37% and the median "allowed verdict" by 36%.83
The cap also affects 18% of settled cases and reduces the
UNCERTAINTY 189 (1999).
75. Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reform on
Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. s183 (2007).
76. Id. It is a separate question as to whether savings in insurance costs
are passed on to customers in the form of lower premiums.
77. His data come from the National Practitioner Data Bank, published
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. By statute,
since 1990 all medical malpractice payments are to be reported to the
Department within thirty days. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The large effect is compatible with the finding that more than
30% of the cases in Avraham's data base had awards greater than $250,000,
the cap that exists in many states. Id. at 26.
80. Id. at 28.
81. David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damage Caps in
Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995649.
82. The Texas noneconomic damage cap applies only to medical
malpractice cases. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 74.
83. Hyman et al., supra note 81, at 2.
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aggregate payout in these cases by 18%.84
Sloan et al. report that all caps reduced payments by 38% and
caps on noneconomic damages reduced payments by 31%. 85 Yoon
concludes that from 1987 to 1999, damage awards in Alabama
decreased by roughly $20,000 after caps were imposed and then
increased by roughly $40,000 when the caps were lifted.86
Pace et al.87 provide a valuable look at caps on jury verdicts in
California. 88 Forty-five percent of the 257 trials they studied had
at least one award that exceeded the California $250,000 cap. 89
As a result of the cap, total payment by defendants (economic and
noneconomic damages combined) was reduced by 30%.90 In the
capped cases, the median reduction of the award was $366,000.91
3. How Caps Are Related to Injury Severity, Gender and Age on
Awards.
Because economic damages and noneconomic damages are
84. Id.
85. Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed
Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
663, 678 (1989).
86. Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study
of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199,
203 (2001). See also W. Kip Viscusi et al., Damage Caps, Insurability, and
the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance, 72 J. RISK & INS. 23
(2005).
87. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA
(2004).
88. Note that these data are at the trial level whereas Avraham's data
include thousands of reported cases, the vast majority of which did not go to
trial. Part of the problem with getting a fuller understanding of the effects of
tort reform measures is the fact that research is often focused on different
parts of the disputing pyramid. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 12, at 235;
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System--And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1184 (1992). As
an aside, only 22% of the medical malpractice trials in the Pace et al. study
resulted in a plaintiff verdict. This low percentage is consistent with other
data. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453,
1459-60 (2007); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice
Litigation and Tort Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085,
1125-27 (2006).
89. PACE ETAL., supra note 87, at 22.
90. Id. at 21.
91. Id. at 22 tbl.3.2. The effect was larger in cases that involved death.
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positively correlated, we should anticipate that caps are more
likely to affect those with more serious injuries. Nearly all the
research reviewed above confirms this belief. For example, in the
Pace et al. study, cases involving more seriously injured plaintiffs
were more likely to be capped than those involving less serious
injuries, although caps affect cases at many levels. Sixty-five
percent of the verdicts involving brain damages were capped while
27% of the cases involving an injury to a foot or an ankle were
capped. 9 2
Finley discusses a separate effect of caps-they lead to gender
differences. 9 3  Finley analyzed medical malpractice cases
appearing in jury verdict reporters in California between 1992 and
2002. Part of her analysis looked at 131 "gender neutral" injuries
to adults, these are injuries that could happen to anyone
regardless of gender. The mean total award for women in this
group of cases was $1,227,000, comprised of a mean economic
award of $269,000 and a mean noneconomic award of $959,000.
Thus, the noneconomic damages constituted approximately 78% of
the total award. For men, the equivalent numbers are: total
award, $2,342,000; economic damages, $1,216,000; noneconomic
damages, $1,126,000. Noneconomic damages comprised only 45%
of their award. Because noneconomic damages were a larger
percentage of awards to women, cap reductions result in a larger
reduction in overall awards. For women, the cap on noneconomic
damages reduced tort recoveries by 48.4%. The cap on
noneconomic loss damages reduced men's tort recoveries by 40%. 9 4
The Pace study uncovered gender difference of a similar
nature. Forty-four percent of the awards to males in their study
exceeded the cap while 39% of the awards to women did so. The
median reduction for men was $460,000 and for women $260,000.
However, consistent with Finley, they found the median change in
total award in capped cases was 25% for males and 34% for
females. 95
Finley also notes that women may suffer injuries unique to
their gender, such as impaired fertility or pregnancy loss, that
92. Id. at 28 tbl.3.8.
93. See Finley, supra note 12, at 1267.
94. Id. at 1285. Finley observed a similar pattern in wrongful death
cases. Id. at 1290-91.
95. PACE ETAL., supra note 87, at 33 tbl.3.12.
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may result in relatively lower economic damages; thus, caps on
noneconomic damages will take an even larger percentage of the
total recovery. 96
Finley's article includes a discussion of recoveries by the
elderly97 and infants, but does not break down the data by other
age categories. Pace et al. do include such a breakdown. 71% of
the cases involving children under the age of one were capped,
67% of the awards to plaintiffs sixty-five and older exceeded the
caps, but only 2% of the cases involving plaintiffs between the
ages of forty-two and sixty-four were capped. 98 The strikingly low
percentage of capped noneconomic damages for middle aged
people is not the result of a small number of people in the study.
There were a total of sixty-one cases involving plaintiffs in this
age group. This extreme result may be an aberration of this
dataset, but there do seem to be age related differences in the size
of pain and suffering awards. Bovbjerg et al. report data from
another study that found plaintiffs between the ages fifty-one and
sixty-four were awarded higher levels of noneconomic
compensation than those between thirty-five and fifty.99 Absent
detailed information about each case, it is impossible to know
whether these age differences reflect: (a) differences in the
severity of injury; or (b) jury perceptions that given the same
injury, people of different ages experience more or less pain and
suffering simply because of their age.
Whether the gender and age differences observed in these
studies constitute discrimination (and, if so, in what direction)
depends on one's point of view.100 Finley adopts the position that
because women generally recover smaller awards for economic
damages (due perhaps to smaller recoveries for wage loss) we
should measure the discriminatory effect of caps by looking at the
96. See Finley, supra note 12, at 1266.
97. For elderly plaintiffs, the gender situation was reversed. Caps
produced an average 42.5% reduction in recoverable damages for men and an
average 31.7% reduction in recoverable damages for women. See id. at 1288-
89. Overall, the total reduction for older plaintiffs was somewhat lower
(34.6%) than for the total population of all plaintiffs. Id. at 1287.
98. PACE ETAL., supra note 87, at 31 tbl.3.11.
99. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 944 tbl.5 (1989).
100. I am unaware of any experimental research that specifically studies
whether juries award more or less noneconomic damages for the same injury
simply because of the plaintiffs gender or age.
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reduction in total awards. If, however, one looks solely at the
effect of caps on noneconomic damages, her data (and that of Pace)
indicate that male awards take a larger percentage hit.
Regardless of the spin one puts on these data, they reflect the
inherent inequality of an individualized damages system that is
intended to compensate fully plaintiffs for their economic damages
and, insofar as money can do so, to put them back into the position
they enjoyed prior to their injury. This means that those with
more, e.g., better jobs, longer life expectancy, etc., are entitled to
larger damages for the same injury and that death often produces
far smaller economic losses than severe injury.li Should these
inequalities be made up for in the size of noneconomic awards?
Tort theory says no, but Professor Finley seems to say that at
least to some extent it should.
4. Caps and the Willingness to Take a Case
Setting aside the question of fairness, the relationship
between economic and noneconomic damages brings us to a second
question. When a meritorious case involves relatively small
economic damages, do caps cause plaintiff attorneys to refuse to
take cases that they would take in the absence of caps? Finley
speculates that disparities in the ratio of economic to noneconomic
damages will cause lawyers to refuse to take cases of female
plaintiffs at a disproportionate rate.10 2 Michael Rustad provides
more insight on this issue in his study of nursing home cases.
Because many nursing home abuse cases involve relatively low
economic losses, they are an area where reductions in
noneconomic damages may lead to a substantial reduction in total
award. 103
Rustad argues that damage caps in Texas have caused this
type of litigation to become so undesirable that plaintiff lawyers
will no longer take most nursing home cases on a contingency fee
101. For example, in the Finley study, the average economic damage
award for the death of an infant was $32,000 while the average award for
seriously injured infants was $7,426,000. See Finley, supra note 12, at 1292-
93.
102. Id. at 1313.
103. Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of
Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14
ELDER L.J. 331 (2006).
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basis. 104 The evidence for this is based on interviews with trial
lawyers who say that they are leaving this area of practice. 10 5
Daniels & Martin report similar statements by other Texas trial
lawyers who argue that tort reform has caused them to move their
practice away from personal injury cases, especially from
malpractice cases. 10 6 Although Rustad and Daniels & Martin
focus their attention on Texas, it is not clear that the situation
there is any different than that which prevails in other states with
similar caps. Rustad, for example, quotes one California attorney
who was of the opinion that California's cap makes "most nursing
home cases 'zero damages' cases because the cost of litigation
exceeds the potential value of the award."10 7
Unfortunately, all of these studies rely heavily on attorney
self-reports to measure the effect of noneconomic caps on the
viability of cases. Studies based on this type of data have the
same inherent limitations as do studies relying on physician self-
reports to assess whether the tort system causes doctors to
practice defensive medicine. Both doctors and plaintiff lawyers
have an incentive to exaggerate the bad effects of what are to
them undesirable laws. Perhaps a better estimate of the effect of
caps comes from studies such as Avraham's, discussed above,
which report that caps lead to approximately a 10% decline in
cases in states where they exist. Unfortunately, this research
cannot tell us how much of this reduction is the result of attorney
unwillingness to take cases they otherwise would have taken in
the absence of caps. A full analysis of this question requires a
more fine grained analysis than we have to date.108
5. Summary
How might we sum up caps? They are the most effective of all
104. Id. at 374.
105. Id. at 375-76.
106. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on
the Link Between Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 668 (2006). See also Daniels & Martin, supra note 19, at
312-16. The Texas cap only applies to medical malpractice cases.
107. Rustad, supra note 103, at 371.
108. If we assume the decision to take a case is based on a rational cost-
benefit analysis, even cases with small noneconomic awards would be worth
taking if the estimated cost of litigating the case is substantially below the
cap.
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tort reform measures if by effective we mean that they have a
measurable impact on the tort system. Although their impact on
insurance rates is minor, they have a much greater effect on the
number of suits and the size of awards. Caps may increase the
probability of settlement by reducing uncertainty, however, they
are most likely to do this in cases where noneconomic damages are
potentially large. Studies of actual jury outcomes confirm that the
impact of caps is visited most on the more seriously injured
plaintiffs, whose noneconomic awards are most likely to be above
the caps. Historically, studies have found that this group of
plaintiffs tends to be the most undercompensated even without
caps.10 9 There is some evidence that caps limit the willingness of
plaintiff attorneys to take certain types of cases, especially those
where the potential economic damages are low.
Finally, and most important, whatever aggregate effects caps
may have, they do nothing to resolve the problem that similarly
situated plaintiffs may receive widely varying recoveries.
Moreover, caps may create the opposite injustice of compelling
people in very different circumstances to accept exactly the same
noneconomic damage award. What alternatives might we
consider?
C. Abolishing Noneconomic Damages Entirely
The most radical solution to the problems posed by the
indeterminacy of noneconomic damages is simply to abolish them.
Over the years, some scholars have called for the complete
abolition of general damages. 110 From one perspective, these calls
are easily dismissed. For one thing, they violate one of my
principles for better tort reform, that it must be doable. Unless
this change is accompanied by other fundamental changes in the
way we deal with injury in our society, abolishing general
damages does not seem to be within the realm of possibility.
1 11
109. Saks, supra note 88, at 1216-23. See also Luke Ledbetter, "It's the
[Tort System], Stupid" Consumer Deductibles: How to More Equitably
Distribute the Risks of Medical Malpractice and Adequately Compensate
Victims Without Statutory Damage Caps, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 51, 62-68
(2006).
110. See, e.g., Clarence Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 476, 476 (1959).
111. The sorts of changes I have in mind here are a decision to go
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Nevertheless, a brief discussion of these proposals is worthwhile
because it reinforces the point that the present system is seriously
flawed and that caps on damages alone cannot repair these flaws.
The two most recent calls for abolishing general damages are
by Richard Abel 112 and Joseph King. 113 Each makes the same set
of criticisms about general damages. The relationship between
general damages and the overarching goals of tort law
(compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice) is tenuous. 114
Justifications, such as they are, are often based on practical
considerations such as the frequent observation that pain and
suffering damages provide a fund of money with which to pay the
plaintiffs lawyer's contingency fee without depriving the plaintiff
of funds sufficient to actually pay medical bills or replace lost
earnings. 115 Moreover, awarding money for pain and suffering
leaves the legal system open to the criticism that it is monetizing
something upon which a, dollar value cannot be placed, thus
violating our well-founded sense of incommensurability. 16
If there is one thing that ties these critiques together,
however, it is the sense that the combination of
incommensurability, incalculability due to the absence of a market
against which to judge appropriateness, 117 and the absence of any
meaningful guidance to jurors when they are asked to decide
cases, 118 results in unprincipled differences in outcome. 119 This
exclusively to a no-fault automobile insurance plan or a full blown national
health care system.
112. Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable,
Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006).
113. Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and
the Goals of Tort Law, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 163 (2004).
114. Id. at 164. See also Chase, supra note 34, at 764-65.
115. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 399 (2d ed. 1993); Mark Geistfeld,
Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 801
(1995).
116. King, supra note 113, at 171; Abel, supra note 112, at 270. See also
Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785 (1990); Margaret
Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993);
Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659 (2003).
117. King, supra note 113, at 175; Chase, supra note 34, at 765; Levin,
supra note 34, at 308.
118. King, supra note 113, at 175. King quotes Roselle L. Wissler et al.,
Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 736 (2000), for the proposition that instructions from the
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fundamental problem with noneconomic damages is left relatively
untouched by damage caps.
D. Limiting Variance in Awards
1. Schedules and Scenarios
There is a better alternative: take steps designed to limit the
variance in awards. In an earlier article, I reviewed a number of
these proposals. 120 Most fall into two basic types.
One type of proposal places greater responsibility on trial
judges to monitor and adjust awards. 12 1 A 1987 ABA Commission
court on how to assess general damages are "breathtakingly unhelpful" in
achieving greater predictability of noneconomic awards. See Chase, supra
note 34, at 768-69 for examples of typical instructions.
119. The issue of unprincipled differences between awards is different
from the issue of whether any award is principled. When two similar people
suffer the same physical injury and are awarded very different amounts in
general damages, there are no commonly agreed upon criteria by which we
could say that one amount is correct and the other amount is incorrect. To
take but one recent example, in Philip Morris Inc. v. French, 897 So. 2d 480
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied, 918 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2005) the plaintiff,
TWA flight attendant Lynn French, sued several tobacco companies for her
sinusitis allegedly caused by breathing second hand smoke on the job. The
jury found for the plaintiff and awarded her a total of $2 million for past pain
and suffering and $3.5 million for future pain and suffering. The trial judge
granted the defendant's motion for a remittitur and reduced the award to
$500,000. Similar outcomes in other cases are reported in WEILER, supra
note 32, at 55 n.39. In one case, a jury award of $25 million for the distress of
a mother who saw her children killed in a traffic accident was reduced to $2.5
million. In each of these cases it is impossible to say that one result is correct
and the other is error or that there is some third amount that is superior to
both of these amounts.
120. Sanders, supra note 35.
121. Today, tools such as additur and remittitur are rarely used to
accomplish this objective, and when they are used their application does not
appear to be much more principled than the jury judgments they are altering.
Apparently, only New York has a statute directing the appellate division to
"determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially
from what would be reasonable compensation." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c)
(McKinney 1995). This rule replaced the older, common law "shock the
conscience" standard that still exists in many states. In determining if
awards "deviate materially," New York courts look to awards approved in
similar cases. See Eva Madison, The Supreme Court Sets New Standards of
Review for Excessive Verdicts in Federal Court in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc., 50 ARK. L. REv. 591, 595 (1997); Charles D. Cole, Jr.,
Charging the Jury on Damages in Personal-Injury Cases: How New York Can
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report on tort damages recommended measures along these
lines. 122 It found that there should be greater use of additur and
remittitur by trial and appellate courts to set aside pain and
suffering verdicts that are "clearly disproportionate to community
expectations.' 123 A fleshed out version of this approach can be
found in Baldus et al. 124 They propose that judges compare a
Benefit from the English Practice, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1 (2004).
At least one federal circuit has moved in the New York direction. The Fifth
Circuit has occasionally applied the maximum recovery rule to createjudicially a cap on general damages. Some opinions have used the rule to cap
non-pecuniary damages at 133% of the highest previous recovery in similar
cases. Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1990).
See also, Lejeune v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., 247 F.
App'x 572 (5th Cir. 2007); Lebron v. United States, 279 F.3d 321, 328 (5th
Cir. 2002). For a discussion of the rule, see Lawrence James Madigan,
Excessive Damage Review in the Fifth Circuit: A Quagmire of Inconsistency,
34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 429 (2003).
Recently, Judge Posner applied a similar rule in a Seventh Circuit
opinion. In Arpin v. United States, the court vacated and remanded an award
for loss of consortium awarded by the trial judge after a bench trial. Nos. 07-
1079, 07-1106, 2008 WL 927686, at *8 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 2008). The trial
court's justification for a $7 million loss of consortium award for a wife and
four adult children was that "it is difficult to put a value on something that is
priceless. Mrs. Arpin is far more dependent on her husband than are her
children. Her children have suffered the loss of a father that is great and the
devastation to this family is immeasurable." Id. at *6. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that this explanation was insufficient to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a) requiring the judge to explain the grounds of his decision. The court
said:
One cannot but sympathize with the inability of the district judge in
this case to say more than he did in justification of the damages that
he assessed for lost of consortium. But the figures were plucked out
of the air, and that procedure cannot be squared with the duty of
reasoned, articulate adjudication imposed by Rule 52(a).
Id.
The court recommended to the trial judge that he examine the
average ratio of consortium damages to economic damages in wrongful-death
cases in which the award of such damages was affirmed on appeal and then
adjust the award upward or downward on the basis of case-specific factors
such as the age of children, whether they are minors and the closeness of the
relationship between the decedent and this family. Id. at *6-7.
122. ABA, Report of the Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability
System 10-15 (1987).
123. Id. at 13.
124. David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damage
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of
Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOwA L. REV.
1109 (1995).
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given case to a group of cases in which the plaintiff suffered
similar injuries. The injuries in each of the comparison cases
would be ranked on a five point scale from much less to much
more severe. The actual awards in each of the comparison cases
would then be adjusted to reflect the award that would have been
returned if the level of harm in the comparison case had been the
same as that in the case under review. At this point the court can
compare the award in the case at hand to the "adjusted" awards in
other cases. Finally, under the Baldus proposal the court would
establish a range of reasonableness and verdicts would be
affirmed only if they were no more than 10% higher than the
highest adjusted award. 12 5
The second type of proposal is designed to influence jury
decisions in the first instance. These proposals in turn may be
divided into those that would restrict juries to a range of general
damage amounts and those that only wish to give juries guidance
without any real constraint on their ultimate decision. In their
seminal article on general damages, Bovbjerg et al. propose
alternatives that range from more to less restrictive. 126 Their
most restrictive proposal would create a matrix of values that
awards a fixed sum of general damages based on the severity of
the injury, the body part affected, and the age of the injured party.
The values would be based on past jury findings in each cell,
aggregated across all case types: medical malpractice, products
liability, and so on. 127 The fact finder would have no discretion as
to the size of an award once they placed the plaintiff into an
appropriate age and injury category. 128 A modification of this
125. Id. at 1143-53. The paper does not discuss awards that are too low,
but presumably awards that were more than 10% below the lowest award
could be adjusted upward.
126. Id. at 34.
127. In fact, case type influences noneconomic awards. Awards are higher
in malpractice cases and lower in automobile accident cases. Id. at 943
n.163. This, of course, is another source of horizontal inequality in the award
of noneconomic damages.
128. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 946. Similar, fixed amount
proposals have been advanced by other scholars. See, e.g., Patricia M.
Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND
POLICY 101, 122-23 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); Marcus
L. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 210-11 (1958)
(suggesting that general damages should be capped at 50% of the plaintiffs
proven medical, nursing, and hospital bills); Ronald J. Allen et al., An
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alternative would be to give the jury an upper and lower boundary
that reflects the nature of the plaintiffs injury. The jury would be
told that its award must fall within this range. 129
A similar proposal is advanced by Paul Weiler in his
important book, Medical Malpractice on Trial. Professor Weiler
would support either a sum certain schedule of damages based on
the nature of the plaintiffs injury, or a schedule that allows some
discretion on the part of the jury to deal with "idiosyncratic
cases."
130
Bovbjerg et al. also discuss less restrictive proposals. For
example, they offer an alternative whereby juries would be given a
number of standardized injury scenarios with noneconomic
damages dollar values associated with each scenario. The
scenarios are designed to give juries potential anchors that reflect
the "going rate" for different injuries. The values associated with
the scenarios would not be binding. 131
Versions of the scenario alternative have been proposed by
several other scholars. Professor Chase would provide jurors with
a chart summarizing similar awards in cases of similarly situated
plaintiffs. 132 Wissler et al. would support plans that "pool jury
awards made for similar cases and present these cases and their
award distributions to juries for guidance in reaching their
general damages awards."'13 3 Diamond et al. prefer a plan that
would allow attorneys, with some judicial oversight, to present to
the jury a set of pain and suffering awards that other juries made
External Perspective on the Nature of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages
and Their Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1249, 1275 (2007) (supporting
legislative schedules). Other countries have adopted similar scales. See
Sugarman, supra note 25 for a discussion of a provision in New South Wales,
Australia.
129. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 959.
130. WEILER, supra note 32, at 58-61.
131. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 955.
132. Chase, supra note 34, at 775-76. Professor Chase cites the ALI
Reporters' Study, Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury 199-230 (1991) for
similar positions. It recommends the development of guidelines that givejuries inflation-adjusted damage amounts attached to a number of disability
profiles that vary in terms of severity. Chase notes that the discussion of the
guidelines indicates that the members of the ALI study were not of one mind
as to how binding the guidelines should be on the jury. See also Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 198 (2002).
133. Wissler et al., supra note 44, at 817.
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in similar cases. 134 They envision a procedure similar to the use
of "comparables" in property tax appeals.
A few commentators add an additional component. They
would eliminate all compensatory damages if the plaintiffs injury
did not meet some minimal threshold of seriousness-if, for
example, it involved temporary pain and suffering.1 35 These
proposals are premised on the finding that such claims are often
overcompensated, in part, because of their nuisance value. 136
All of the scenario proposals begin with the assumption that
the most important variable to consider in assessing general
damages is the nature of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Many also have an age of plaintiff component. For example,
Bovbjerg et al.'s proposal calls for constructing hypothetical
scenarios that include information on injury severity, victim age
and/or life expectancy, the extent of pain endured, the extent of an
inability to engage in normal activities, and the duration of each
factor.' 3 7 The proposed scenarios would not allow for variance on
some other dimensions that might be relevant to some jurors. For
example, a survey might reveal that most prospective jurors
believe that, other things being equal, a mother suffers greater
emotional distress from the loss of an infant child than a father,
but there is no provision in the Bovbjerg et al. proposal or any
other proposal of which I am aware to explicitly introduce gender
into any of the scenarios. As the Bovbjerg et al. proposal should
make clear, the construction of scenarios or categories is a
complex matter. Setting aside the question of what variables
should and should not be included, the scenarios must be detailed
134. Diamond et al., supra note 34, at 321-22.
135. WEILER, supra note 32, at 60; ALI Reporters' Study, supra note 132,
at 230/
136. WEILER, supra note 32, at 60. For an interesting discussion of
nuisance value cases, see Randy J Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the
Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1849 (2004).
137. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 34, at 954. The authors suggest that the
scenarios should describe the circumstances of the injury but should not
include any information on responsibility or causation. Id. Obviously, the
authors are worried that jurors will allow the level of defendant culpability to
influence the size of general damage awards, something which formal tort
rules forbid, but something that seems to happen with a fair degree of
frequency in actual cases. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 50; Sharkey,
supra note 63.
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enough to be useful, but without features that make the case
unusual.
My personal preference is for relatively hard schedules that
provide for a range of awards for each category with, perhaps,
some provision to deal with extraordinary cases in much the same
way that sentencing guidelines may be violated under special
circumstances. However, I am not wed to any particular plan and
although each may have its problems I believe all of the
suggestions are superior to the status quo. One should not make
the best the enemy of the good.
2. Objections to Schedules and Scenarios
Each proposal reviewed here has the benefit that it takes
seriously the argument that current arrangements create too
much horizontal inequity and it attempts to narrow the range of
general damage awards for similarly situated plaintiffs.138 For
me, this benefit outweighs a number of potential criticisms of
these proposals. It is important, however to review possible
objections to schedules or scenarios.
First, there is the concern about cost. Depending on which
alternative one employs, there will be the cost of starting up the
system. With respect to the scenario alternatives, there is the cost
of establishing which scenarios to use and how to present them to
the jury. Overall, however, the costs of these proposals seem to be
small, mostly incurred as start-up costs to get the new regime in
place. As an offset, presumably the total time required for counsel
to argue about general damages would be reduced, resulting in
somewhat shorter trials. The post-verdict adjustment alternatives
may lead to increased costs due to appeals of jury damage awards.
As a counterweight to these costs, if, as some have argued,
schedules and/or scenarios increase the probability of a settlement
or of settlement at an earlier point in the lawsuit, this may reduce
overall average litigation costs. In sum, cost is not a fatal
objection.
138. Even the least restrictive of these proposals should narrow variance
to some extent. In one study, Diamond et al. manipulated anchor points.
One-fourth of their jurors heard plaintiff ask for $250,000. This produced
significantly lower awards than those arrived at by jurors who were left
totally on their own. Diamond et al., supra note 34, at 319. They report that
James Zuehl achieved similar results in an unpublished study. Id.
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Second, there is the concern that these proposals would
invade the province of the jury. Here we face a tradeoff. The
proposals that are likely to have the greatest impact in reducing
horizontal inequity are the ones that most clearly limit jury
discretion, and those that leave the most discretion in the hands of
jurors are likely to leave the most residual inequities. Individual
states must seek the balance that they find most comfortable.
This does not mean that no plan is acceptable. In my judgment,
proposals that do no more than anchor jurors by informing them
of average awards in previous similar cases do not undermine jury
judgments any more than knowledge of previous awards
undermines a judge's decision in a bench trial.
Third, some lawyers may object to schedules or scenarios
because they diminish the advocacy skills of the best trial lawyers.
For these skills to have a maximum impact, they require a system
where rhetorical ability can significantly alter outcomes. In a
system where damages are largely determined by a set of fixed
rules, such skills can have little play. 139 For highly skilled elite
trial lawyers, schedules and similar devices diminish an
important aspect of what sets them apart from other personal
injury lawyers. This point is captured in Thomas Galligan's
compelling review of the virtues of the common law tort action and
its incompatibility with damage schedules. 140  In ordinary
litigation:
The specific story dominates the stage. The law's
generalized standards accommodate the details of the
case. Broad standards invite particularistic, event
specific versions of what happened. The detailed story
matters more than it might in a legal landscape of
detailed, particularistic rules. When the story matters,
the individuals matter. The litigants and those whom
they call as witnesses become actors in a play, a play
139. See, e.g., Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile
Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 651 (1990) (discussing
judicially imposed damage ranges in Japan).
140. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 139, 172 (1996). Most people who have spent time with plaintiff
personal injury lawyers are struck by their defense of traditional common law
adversarial processes. See Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham,
Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481 (1992).
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about what happened, and each of the characters matters
[sic].
Turning to general damages, we see perhaps the most
dramatic example of tailoring damage awards to the
needs of the particular plaintiff. Juries rendering awards
for mental anguish, pain and suffering, and loss of
enjoyment of life focus not on the average person but once
again, on the particular plaintiff . . . . Fact finders
consider the pain the particular plaintiff suffered, the
mental anguish this plaintiff has suffered, and the loss of
enjoyment of life this plaintiff has suffered. The jury
focuses in on the particular plaintiff involved in the
particular case. It should be noted that recent proposals
to provide jurors with guidelines or schedules for general
damages are inconsistent with traditional rules
concerning general damages. The proposals would
abstract away from the particular plaintiff.141
Galligan is correct. Schedules are likely to diminish those
lawyer skills that maximize the award of an individual client. But
by definition this is a game everyone cannot win. Not every award
can be high, and in my opinion, diminution in the importance of
advocacy skills is a reasonable price to pay for less variance in
awards.
Fourth, there is the question of bargaining strength. One
advantage of uncapped noneconomic damages is that in serious
cases it creates a more symmetrical bargaining space. When
defendants face an unknown upper bound on damages, they may
apply a "danger value" to a case; that is a premium in excess of
the expected value to eliminate exposure to a potentially severe
jury verdict when a case presents a potential for a low frequency,
high severity payout. 142 For defense insurance companies, one
advantage of caps on damages is that they restrict the danger
141. Galligan, supra note 140, at 140, 172.
142. H. LAURENCE Ross, SErLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 199 (1970). For two useful articles on the
effect of uncertainty, see Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal
Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 219 (2007); Robert J. Rhee, A Price
Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and
Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 683 (2006).
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value of cases. Caps cause bargaining spaces to become
asymmetrical because in this situation only plaintiffs must
bargain under the handicap of serious risk aversion.
This asymmetry is a reason to oppose caps on damages, but is
not a reason to oppose schedules or scenarios per se. Most
schedules would presumably affect cases that have no danger
value for defendants. Only the more severely injured plaintiffs
present this problem for most insured defendants. Were
schedules and scenarios to operate only on the high side, this
might be a reason to oppose them for the most seriously injured
plaintiffs. However, one should keep in mind that the schedules
and scenarios have a risk-reducing effect for the plaintiff as well.
Plaintiffs would have less reason to fear the very small general
damage awards that may occur in the absence of these devices. In
sum, schedules result in a more symmetrical bargaining space by
reducing the danger value of a case for plaintiffs and defendants
alike.
A final plaintiff objection might be that adopting a version of
these proposals would result in the worst of both worlds: schedules
plus caps. This is a reasonable concern. Low caps and schedules
do present an asymmetry problem in addition to the problems
caps may pose for lawyer compensation within a contingent fee
system. 14 3 To this, I do not have a complete answer. It seems
very unlikely that defense interests would willingly abandon the
hard-won caps in exchange for schedules, unless the schedules
were quite rigid, as they are in Bovjberg et al.'s first proposal or
the post verdict adjustment proposal of Baldus et al.
Nevertheless, a bargain might be struck that trades some type of
schedules for an increase in caps. Moreover scenarios or
schedules might be proposed in jurisdictions that do not now have
caps.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that one good tort reform would
be to adopt some version of the various proposals designed to
143. In this paper, I do not address the question of whether it would be
better to replace contingent fees with some form of a loser pay system. For
one proposal along these lines, see King, supra note 113 (calling for the
abolition of general damages).
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restrict the range of general damage awards for people who are
similarly situated. Given my criteria of what constitutes good tort
reform, I believe these proposals qualify for that label. First, I
think they are doable. At the very least, other states could adopt
the New York rule concerning post verdict adjustments of general
damages. Other changes could be done by the legislature, but I
believe many of these proposals could be implemented by the
courts alone. The biggest obstacle to introducing some of these
changes is not that they are radical or difficult to implement, but
that none of the actors in the system, judges, defense lawyers, and
plaintiff lawyers have an interest in pushing them. Even if this
has been the case in the past, 144 it does not have to remain the
case in the future. I take heart from efforts to permit jurors
greater privileges, such as taking notes, asking questions, and
even engaging in pre-deliberation discussions of the case.
Proposals along these lines languished for years, but in recent
times a number of jurisdictions have moved to implement some or
all of these good reforms. 145
Second, this reform addresses an aspect of the current system
that most would agree produces unjust outcomes. We in the legal
community may sometimes lose sight of this fact because we have
rationalized variation in general damages as not being that bad,
or as somehow explainable if only we knew all the considerations
that went into each separate jury decision. Ask the citizenry at
large, however, whether differences of an order of magnitude are
acceptable, and the answer is almost certainly no. The recent
experience with the 9/11 fund is a cogent reminder that
unwarranted variance in general damages is perceived to be
unjust.
Third, I believe these reforms can garner some support from
relevant constituencies, or at the very least they would not
engender immediate opposition and implacable hostility from the
judiciary, the plaintiff bar, or the defense bar. On this point,
144. See Sanders, supra note 35, at 507-14.
145. Randall T. Shepard, Jury Trials Aren't What They Used To Be, 38
IND. L. REV. 859, 864 (2005); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More
Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 95, 151-62 (1996). See also Nancy S. Marder,
Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 449 (2006); Valerie P. Hans et al., The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting
Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and
Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 349 (1999).
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unfortunately, I could be wrong. The tort wars have produced
such a hostile environment that some proposals seem to create
opposition simply because someone on the other side first
suggested them. I expect that some who oppose the proposals put
forth in this paper will conclude that I must be in the opposite
camp (whichever camp that happens to be). But this observation
leads me to one final point about why constraining general
damages in the ways proposed here is a good idea. Surely the
adoption of some version of this proposal will not bring peace in
our time. It might, however, be a moment of detente and act as a
small step toward de-politicizing the battle over torts. On that
score as well, this reform counts as a good one.
